By treating belief as a modality and combining this with problems about constant truth tellers and constant liars (knights and knaves) we obtain some curious epistemic counterparts of undecidability results in metamathematics. Godel's second theorem gets reflected in a logician who cannot believe in his own consistency without becoming inconsistent.
We shall consider some "epistemic" problems related to undecidability results in metamathematics.
Our action shall take place on an island in which each native is classified as either a knight or a knave. Knights make only true statements and knaves make only false ones. Any such island w i l l be called a knight-knave ' island. On such an island, no native can claim to be a knave, since no knight would falsely claim to be a knave and no knave would correctly claim to be one.
Our two main characters are a logician L who v i s i t s the island and meets a native N who makes a statement to L.
FOREVER UNDECIDED
We w i l l say that L is (always) accurate i f he never believes any false proposition.
Problem 1 An accurate logician L v i s i t s the island and meets a native N who makes a certain statement.
Once the native has made this statement, i t becomes logically impossible for L to ever decide whether N is a knight or a knave ( i f L should ever decide either way, he w i l l lose his accuracy).
What statement could N make to ensure this? Solution One solution is that N s a y s : "You w i l l never believe that I am a knight." I f L ever believes that N is a knight, this w i l l f a l s i f y N's statement, making N a knave and hence making L inaccurate in believing that N is a knight. Therefore, since L is accurate, he w i l l never believe that N is a knight. Hence N's statement was true, so N really is a knight. I t further follows that N w i l l never have the false belief that N is a knave. And so L must remain forever undecided as to whether N is a knight or a knave.
Discussion
The character N (as well as L) w i l l be constant throughout this a r t i c l e .
We shall l e t k be the proposition that N is a knight. Now, whenever N asserts a proposition p, the r e a l i t y of the situation is that k~p is true (N is a knight i f and only i f p).
For any proposition p, we shall l e t Bp be the proposition that L does or w i l l believe p.
The native N has asserted -Bk (you will never believe I'm a knight) and so k~-Bk is true. From this we concluded that k must be true, but L can never believe k (assuming that L is always accurate).
More generally, given an Z proposition p such that p~-Bp is true, if L is accurate, then p is true, but L will never believe p (nor will he believe -p).
There is a complete parallelism between logicians who believe propositions and mathematical systems that prove propositions.
When dealing with the latter, we will let Bp be the proposition that p is provable in the system.* In the system dealt with by Godel, there is a proposition p such that p~-Bp is true (even provable) in the system. Under the assumption that all provable propositions of the system are true (under a standard interpretation), it then follows (by the argument of Problem 1) that p, though true, is not provable in the system--nor is the false proposition -p.
AN ACCURACY PREDICAMENT
For the problems that now follow, we must say more about the logician's reasoning abilities: We will say that he is of type 1 if he has a complete knowledge of propositional logic--i.e, he sooner or later believes every tautology (any proposition provable by truth-tables) and his beliefs (past, present and future) are closed under modus ponens--i.e, if he ever believes p and believes p~q (p implies q) then he will (sooner or later) believe q.
Of course these assumptions are highly idealized, since there are infinitely many tautologies, but we can assume that the logician is immortal.
We henceforth assume that L is of type I.
From this it follows that given any propositions that L believes, he will sooner or later believe every proposition that can be derived from them by propositional logic. We shall also make the inessential assumption that if L can derive a conclusion q from a proposition p taken as a premise, he will then believe pDq. {This assumption adds nothing to the set of L's beliefs, but it makes many of the arguments shorter and more transparent.] It is to be understood in all the problems that follow, that when L visits the knight-knave island that he believes it is a knight-knave island, and so when he hears N assert a proposition p, then L believes the proposition k~p (N is a knight if and only if p).
*More precisely, we have a formula Bew(x) (read: "x is the Godel number of a provable sentence") and for any proposition (sentence) p we let Bp be the sentence Bew(B), where n is the GOdel number of p.
We shall say that L believes he is (always) accurate i f for every proposition p, L believes BpDp (he believes: " I f ! should ever believe p, then p must be true.") A reasoner (logician) who believes he is always accurate might aptly be called conceited.
Probl em 2
A reasoner L of type 1 visits the island and N says to him: "You w i l l never believe that I'm a knight." The interesting thing now is that i f L believes that he is always accurate, then he w i l l become inaccurate. Why is this?
Sol ution
Suppose L believes that he is always accurate. Then he w i l l reason: " I f N is a knave, his statement is false, which means that I w i l l believe he's a knight and hence be inaccurate. This is impossible, since I am always accurate. Therefore he can't be a knave; he must be a knight."
At this point L believes that N is a knight, which makes N's statement false, hence N is really a knave. Thus L is inaccurate in believing that N is a knight.
[We might remark that i f L hadn't assumed his own accuracy, he would never have lapsed into an inaccuracy. He has been j u s t l y punished for his conceit!]
Peculiarity
We w i l l call a reasoner peculiar i f there is some proposition p such that he believes p and also believes that he doesn't believe p.
[This strange condition doesn't necessarily involve a logical inconsistency, but i t is certainly a psychological peculiarity!] Problem 2A
Show that under the hypotheses of Problem 2, L w i l l become not only inaccurate, but peculiar!
Sol ution
We have seen that L w i l l believe that N is a knight.
Then L w i l l believe what N said and hence believe that he doesn't believe that N is a knight, Remark. Even if the island that L visits is not a really a knightknav~nd, but L only believes that it is (he believes k~-Bk) the above argument goes through (th6u-gh the argument of Problem 2 does not).
THE GODEL CONSISTENCY PREDI CAMENT
We shall say that L is of t~if he is of type 1 and also knows that his beliefs are closed under modus ponens--i.e, for every p and q he (correctly) believes:
"If I should ever believe both p and pDq, then I will believe q." And so he believes (Bp&B(pDq))DBq [and being of type 1, he also believes the logically equivalent proposition: B(p~q)~(BpDBq)].
We shall call a reasoner normal if whenever he believes p, he also believes that he believes p. We shall say that he believes he is normal if he believes all propositions of the form Bp~BBp (he believes: "If I should ever believe p, then I will believe that I believe p.")
We define a reasoner to be of ~_pe 3 if he is a normal reasoner of type 2. If he also believes that he is normal, then we define him to be of type 4. Our main concern w111 be with reasoners of type 4. [They are the counterparts of mathematical systems of type 4--defined analogously, only reading "provable" for "B".| A reasoner of type 4 (or even type 3) who believes pDq will also believe B(p~q) (by normality), hence will believe BpDBq (since he believes B(pDq)D(Bp~Bq)).
This means that if a reasoner L of type 4 visits a knight-knave island (or even one that he believes is a knight-knave island) and hears a native N assert a proposition p, then he will not only believe k~p (which he will, since he will believe k~p), but will also believe Bk~Bp (he will believe: "If I should ever believe he's a knight, then I will believe what he said."). He will also believe B-kDB-p.
We shall define a reasoner to be consistent if he never believes any proposition and its negation. {An inconsistent reasoner of even type 1 will sooner or later believe every proposition q, since pD~pDq) is a tautology. Also, if we take some fixed contradictory proposition f (for logical falsehood), a type 1 reasoner is consistent if and only if he never believes f, since for every p, the proposition fDp is logically true, hence if the reasoner believes f, he will believe p).
We will say that a reasoner believes he is consistent if for every proposition p he believes ~(Bp&B-p) (he believes: "I will never believe both p and ~p").
[For a reasoner of type 4--or even of type 3,--this is equivalent to his believing that he will never believe f. This is not hard to show.| Now we come to our first "big" problem, Problem 3 {After Godel's Second Theoreml -A logician L of type 4 visits a knight-knave island (or at least he believes it to be one) and meets N who says: "You will never believe that I'm a knight."
Prove that if L is consistent, he can never know that he is--or put another way, if L ever believes that he is consistent, he will become inconsistent.
Solution
Suppose L is confident of his consistency.
Then he will reason: "Suppose I never believe he's a knight. Then I'll believe what he said--I'll believe that I don't believe he's a knight.
But if I ever believe he's a knight, I'll also believe that I do believe he's a knight (since I am normal).
This means I would be inconsistent, which isn't possible (sic!).
Therefore, I never will believe he's a knight. He said I never would, hence he's a knight."
At this point, L believes that N is a knight. Being normal, he then continues: "Now I believe he's a knight. He said I never would, so he's a knave."
At this point L is inconsistent (a while ago he believed N was a knight).
Discussion
Isn't it possible for a consistent reasoner of type 4 to know that he is consistent?
Yes, but only if he believes no proposition of the form p~-Bp. [In the above problem, for example, L should have had the good sense to doubt that he was really on a knight-knave island!] However, with the type of mathematical system investigated by Godel, the analogous option is not open--there really is a proposition p such that p=--Bp is provable in the system (and the sys--'tem is of type 4).
And so, by an analogous argument, the system, if consistent, cannot prove its own consistency (say in the form that-Bf is not provable).
Henkin' s Problem
For the same system, there is also a proposition p such that p=-Bp is provable in the system. [This is like a native of the island who says: "You will believe that I'm a knight."] On the fact of it, p could be true and provable, or false and unprovable; is there any way to tell which? This problem remained open for some years and was finally solved by Lob, who showed the stronger fact that if Bp~p is provable in the system, so is p.
[His proof utilized the fact that there is also another proposition q such that q~(Bp~q) is provable in the system.| epistemic version of this.
We now turn to a striking
SELF-FULFILLING BELIEFS AND LOB'S THEOREM
We now have a change of scenario. A logician L of type 4 is thinking of visiting the island of knights and knaves because he has heard a rumor that the sulphur baths and mineral waters there might cure his rheumatism. He is home discussing this with his family physician and asks: "Does the cure really work?" The doctor replies:
"The cure is largely psychological; the belief that it works is self-fulfilling. If you believe that the cure will work, then it will."
The logician fully trusts his doctor and so he goes to the island with the prior belief that if he should believe that the cure will work, then it will. He takes the cure, which lasts a day, and which is supposed to work in a few weeks (if it works at all). But the next day, he starts worrying: He thinks: "I know that if I should believe that the cure will work, then it will, but what evidence do I have that I will ever believe that the cure works? And so how do I know that it will?" A native N passes by and asks L why he looks so disconsolate. L explains the situation and concludes: "--and so how do I know that the cure will work?" N then draws himself up in a dignified manner and says: "If you ever believe I'm a knight, then the cure will work."
Problem 4
Amazingly enough, the logician will believe that the cure will work, and, if his doctor was right, it will. How is this proved?
Solution
We let c be the proposition that the cure will work. L has the prior belief that Bc~c. Also, since N said that Bk~c, L believes k~(Bk~c). And so L reasons: "Suppose I ever believe that he's a knight (suppose I believe k). Then I'll believe what he said--I'll believe Bk~c. But if I believe k, I'll also believe Bk (since I am normal). Once I believe Bk and believe BkDc, I'll believe c.
Thus, if I ever believe he's a knight, then I'll believe that the cure will work. But if I believe that the cure will work,""then it will (as my doctor told me). Therefore, if I ever believe he's a knight, then the cure will work. Well, that's exactly what he said, hence he's a knight!" At this point, L believes that N is a knight. Since L is normal, he continues: "Now I believe he's a knight. And I have already proved that if I believe he's a knight, then the cure will work. Therefore the cure will work."
The logician now believes that the cure will work. Then (if his doctor was right), it will.
Reflexive Reasoners (and Sxstems) Generalizing the above problem, for any proposition p, if a reasoner of type 4 believes BpDp, and if there is a proposition q such that he believes q~(BqDq), then he will believe p.
We will call a reasoner reflexive if for every proposition p there is some q such that the reasoner believes q~(BqDp). And so if a reflexive reasoner of type 4 believes BpDp, he will believe p. This is Lob's theorem (for reasoners).
For systems, we define reflexivity to mean that for any p (in the language of the system) there is some q such that q~(Bq~p) is provable in the system. Lob's theorem (in a general form) is that for any reflexive system of type 4, if Bp~p is provable in the system, so is p.
Remarks
Here are some variants of Problem 4 that the reader might like to try as exercises: Suppose N had instead said: "The cure doesn't work and you will believe that I'm a knave." Prove that L will believe that the cure works.
Here are some other things that N could have said to ensure that L will believe that the cure works:
(1) If you believe that I'm a knight, then you will believe that the cure will work.
(2) You will believe that if I am a knight then the cure will work.
(3) You will believe I'm a knave, but you will never believe that the cure will work.
(4) You will never believe either that I'm a knight or that the cure will work.
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THE STABILITY PREDICAMENT
We will call a reasoner unstable if there is some proposition p such that he believes that he bel~eves p, but doesn't really believe p. [This is just as strange a psychological phenomenon as peculiarity!]
We will call him stable if he is not unstable--i.e, for every p, if he believes Bp then he believes p.
[Note that stability is the converse of normality.]
We will say that a reasoner believes that he is stable if for every proposition p, he believes BBpDBp (he believes:
"If I should ever believe that I believe p, then I really will believe p).
Problem 5
If a consistent reflexive reasoner of type 4 believes that he is stable, then he will become unstable. Stated otherwise, if a stable reflexive reasoner of type 4 believes that he is stable, then he will become inconsistent. Why is this?
Solution
Suppose that a stable reflexive reasoner of type 4 believes that he is stable. We will show that he will (sooner or later) believe every proposition p (and hence be inconsistent).
Take any proposition p. The reasoner believes BBp~Bp, hence by Lob's theorem he will believe Bp (because he believes Br~r, where r is the proposition Bp, and so he will believe r, which is the proposition Bp). Being stable, he will then believe p.
A qUESTION OF TIMIDITy
The following problem affords another (and rather simple) illustration of how a belief can be self-fulfilling.
Problem 6
A certain country is ruled by a tyrant who owns a brain-reading machine with which he can read the thoughts of all the inhabitants. Each inhabitant is a normal, stable reasoner of type 1.
There is one particular proposition E which all the inhabitants are forbidden to believe--any inhabitant who believes E gets executed! Now, given any proposition p, we will say that it is dangerous for a given inhabitant to believe p if his believing p will lead him to believing E.
The problem is to prove that for any proposition p, i f a given inhabitant believes that i t is dangerous for him to believe p, then i t r e a l l y is dangerous for him to believe p.
Solution
Suppose an inhabitant does believe that i t is dangerous for him to believe p.
He thus believes the proposition Bp~BE. We w i l l show that BpDBE is therefore t r u e --i . e , i f he should ever believe p, then he really w i l l believe E.
Suppose he believes p.
Being normal, he w i l l then believe Bpo And since he also believes Bp~BE and is of type 1, he w i l l believe BE. Then, since he is stable, he w i l l believe E.
A GRAND INDECISION
We again consider a reflexive, stable reasoner of type 4. There is a proposition p such that he can never believe p and can never believe -p without becoming inconsistent in either case. [And so i f he is consistent, he w i l l never believe either one.)
Can you find such a proposition p? {Note: Unlike Problem 1, we are not assuming that the reasoner is always accurate.]
Solution
We let f be any tautologically contradictory proposition--any proposition such that -f is a tautology. Then for any proposition q, the proposition -q~(q:~f) is a tautology, and so any reasoner--even of type 1--who believes -q w i l l believe qDf.
We now take for p the proposition Bf--the proposition that the reasoner believes (or w i l l believe) f.
[Of course i f a reasoner of type 1 believes f , he w i l l be inconsistent, since fDp is a tautology for every p].
I f the reasoner should believe Bf, stable) and hence w i l l be inconsistent. ever believe -Bf, he w i l l believe Bf~f, believe f and again be inconsistent. Georg Kreisel.] he w i l l believe f (since he is On the other hand, i f he should and so by Lob's theorem, he w i l l {This last observation is due to
MODEST REASONERS
We have called a reasoner conceited i f he believes a l l propositions of the form BpDp.
At the other extreme, l e t us call a reasoner modest i f he never believes Bp~p unless he believes p. [If he believes p and is of type 1, he will, of course, have to believe BpDp--in fact q~p for any q whatsoever]. Lob's theorem Tfor reasoners) can be succinctly stated: Any reflexive reasoner of type 4 is modest.
The theory of modest reasoners of type 4 (or rather the analogous theory for systems) is today an elaborate one, of which we can say here but a little.
For one thing, it can be shown that any modest reasoner of type 4 must be reflexive (a sort of converse of Lob's theorem). Another thing: Let us say that a reasoner believes he is modest if for every p, he believes the proposition B(Bpsp)~Bp.
[Of course, all these propositions are true if the reasoner really is modest.] It is not difficult to show that any reasoner of type 4 (or even any normal reasoner of type 1) who believes he is modest really is modest.
[The reader might try this as an exercise.]
It can also be shown (but this is a bit more tricky) that every modest reasoner of type 4 believes that he. is modest. A surprising result (due to Kripke, deJongh and Sambin) is that every reasoner of type 3 who believes he is modest will also believe he is normal--and thus is of type 4! And so for any reasoner, the following 4 conditions are equivalent:
(1) He is a reflexive reasoner of type 4; (2) He is a modest reasoner of type 4; (3) He is a reasoner of type 4 who believes he is modest; (4) He is a reasoner of type 3 who believes he is modest. ]Proofs of these equivalences can be found in [2] , or in a more formal version, in [ll.l Reasoners satisfying any of the above equivalent conditions correspond to an important system of modal logic known as G--accordingly, they are called (in [2] ) reasoners of type G. Boolos [1] has devoted an excellent book to this modal systemLanT-I'2F contains a host of epistemic problems about reasoners of this and other types.
[A particularly curious reasoner to be met in [2] is the queer reasoner--he is of type G and believes that he is inconsistent. But he is wrong in this belief!] I wish to conclude with another epistemic puzzle which I think you might enjoy trying as an exercise.
A reasoner of type 4 (not necessarily reflexive) goes to an island which is and which he believes to be a knight-knave island. He visits it because of a rumor that there is gold buried there.
He meets a native and asks:
"Is there really gold here?" The native then makes two statements:
(1) If you ever believe I'm a knight, then you will believe that there is gold here; (2) If you ever believe I'm a knight, then there is gold here.
Is there gold on this island or not? Why?
